Gifts of Corporate Stock -- Transfer on Corporation Books to Donor and Donee Jointly by Howell, Logan D.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 25 | Number 1 Article 14
12-1-1946
Gifts of Corporate Stock -- Transfer on
Corporation Books to Donor and Donee Jointly
Logan D. Howell
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Logan D. Howell, Gifts of Corporate Stock -- Transfer on Corporation Books to Donor and Donee Jointly, 25 N.C. L. Rev. 91 (1946).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol25/iss1/14
1946] NOTES AND COMMENTS 91
to include actual expenses for nursing and medical service; loss of in-
come;64 suffering, both mental and physical ;55 and any other injury
which naturally and directly are proximate consequences of the wrong-
ful actS6 and which are not elements of damage in the death action.
Punitive damages should not be awarded. 7 If there were an injury to
the property of the injured person as a result of the wrongful act, such
property damages must be recovered in the same action with the per-
sonal injury damages." It would seem that such elements of damage
as permanency of injuries and loss of earning capacity would not be
included since these elements are a part of the elements of damage
resulting from the death.0 It is clear that neither interest 6° nor attorney
fees"' are recoverable as damages.
Only those questions which it is felt the court will of necessity be
called upon to answer in the near future have been brought within the
scope 'of this note. Since the principal case clarifies the existence of a
cause of action which prior to 1915 did not exist and since 1915 evi-
dently was not understood by the bar to exist, it is certain that many
other questions will be presented for determination.
Louis J. PoissoN, JR.
Gifts of Corporate Stock-Transfer on Corporation Books
to Donor and Donee Jointly
In Buffaloe v. Barnes' a purchaser of 70 shares of corporate stock
directed that the certificate be issued in the names of himself and his
niece "as joint tenants with right of survivorship, and not as tenants in
common." He told the broker handling the transaction that he wanted
it that way so that if he pre-deceased her it would belong outright to
her, and if she pre-deceased him it would belong outright to him. The
certificate was delivered to him and was found at his death in his safety
deposit box. A dividend check payable to both had been indorsed by
her and delivered to him. Alleging a gift inter vivos, she -claimed the
shares as survivor in the joint tenancy. In an action by the executor
"Ledford v. Valley River Lumber Co., 183 N. C. 614, 112 S. E. 421 (1922);
Rushing v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 149 N. C. 158, 62 S. E. 890 (1908).
r' Britt v. Carolina Northern R. R., 148 N. C. 37, 61 S. E. 601 (1908), rehear-
ing denied, 149 N. C. 581, 64 S. E. 1135 (1908) (physical injury must accompany
mental suffering).
"Lane v. Southern Ry., 192 N. C. 287, 134 S. E. 855, 51 A. L. R. 1114 (1926).
17 Rippey v. Miller, 33 N. C. 247 (1850).
5 See note 15 supra.
Poe v. Raleigh & A. A. L. R. R., 141 N. C. 525, 54 S. E. 406 (1906) ; Burton
v. Wilmington R. R., 82 N. C. 505 (1880).
" Penny v. A. C. L. R. R., 161 N. C. 523, 77 S. E. 774, Ann. Cas. 1914D 992(1913).
81 Crutchfield v. Foster, 214 N. C. 551, 200 S. E. 395 (1938).
1226 N. C. 313, 38 S. E. (2d) 222 (1946), petition to rehear denied, 226 N. C.
app. (Oct. 9, 1946).
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to determine title to the 70 shares, heard on an agreed statement of
facts, the parties conceded that she was entitled to one half of the stock
in any event. The trial judge's ruling, based on the agreed facts, that
she had title to all the stock was reversed on appeal, two justices dis-
senting. The court said that the facts agreed upon were insufficient to
support that conclusion; that "it would not seem to follow [from the
agreed facts] as a necessary conclusion of law that a present gift was
intended."
The well known general requirements for making a valid gift of
personalty are donative intent, delivery, and acceptance. 2 Where the
subject of the gift is capable of manual delivery, actual delivery is neces-
sary to consummate a gift; otherwise there must be such delivery as
the nature of the property and the surrounding circumstances reason-
ably permit, clearly showing the donor's intention to part with title and
possession and vest the same in the donee.3 In cases where manual
delivery is impossible or impracticable, delivery may be symbolical or
constructive.4 A delivery is symbolical when another object or token
representing the property is handed over instead of the thing itself.5 A
constructive delivery is delivery of the means of obtaining possession
and control of the subject matter of the gift, or the relinquishment in
any manner to the donee of the donor's control and dominion over the
property. A simple example of constructive delivery is a gift of prop-
erty that is locked away by a delivery of the key.8
It is agreed that delivery need not necessarily be directly to the
donee. It may be to a third person for him,7 or the donor may con-
stitute himself trustee for the donee.8 Another rule is that the gift must
be fully executed in the present, and not be intended to take effect in
the future.9 But if a valid gift be made, the fact that the donee's enjoy-
ment of the gift is postponed until some future time, and that the donor
retains possession to receive the income from the property during his
lifetime do not invalidate the gift.'0 Acceptance of the gift is generally
held to be a requisite,"1 but acceptance of a gift beneficial to the donee
will be presumed.' 2
224 Am. JuR., Gifts §§21, 24, 40; BRowx, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PER-
soxAL PaoPERrY (1936 ed.) §37.
' Hudgens v. Tillman, 227 Ala. 672, 151 So. 863 (1933).
'Newman v. Bost, 122 N. C. 524, 29 S. E. 848 (1898) ; Brown, op. cit. supra
note 2, §41.
'Lavender v. Pritchard, 3 N. C. 337 (1805).
'Newman v. Bost, cited supra note 3; Brown, op. cit. supra note 2.
"Payne v. Tobacco Trading Corp., 179 Va. 156, 18 S. E. (2d) 281 (1942).
8 38 C. J. S., Gifts §26.
'Pomerantz v. Pomerantz, 179 Md. 436, 19 A. (2d) 713 (1941).
" Smith v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 59 F. (2d) 533 (C. C. A. 9th,
1932) ; Lynch v. Lynch, 124 Cal. App. 454, 12 P. (2d) 741 (1932).
124 Am. Jua., Gifts §40.1 Grissom v. Sternberger, 10 F. (2d) 764 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926).
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The law applies these same age-sanctioned rules to gifts of choses
in action, including corporate stock, although much difficulty is encoun-
tered due to the dissimilarity in subject matter.1 s Therefore, a gift of
stock may be made by delivery of the certificate with or without indorse-
ment to the donee, if a present gift be intended.14 The usual statutory
provision that transfer be made on the corporation books is uniformly
considered to be for the benefit of the corporation only, and does not
affect the validity of the gift as between the parties.' 5
The conflict in the decisions arises over the question whether trans-
fer on the corporation books without delivery of the certificate to the
donee can constitute constructive delivery sufficient to pass title."8 With
no outside evidence of delivery in its traditional sense available, the
question of donative intent becomes vital.' 7 An examination of the
cases discloses that the results reached reflect in most instances the
varying amounts of evidence present either supporting or negativing the
existence of donative intent.'8 For this reason it clarifies the problem
to classify the cases according to whether or not they contain evidence
regarding donative intent.'0
1 See Mechem, Gifts of Corporation Shares (1925) 20 ILL L. REv. 9.
" Grissom v. Sternberger, 10 F. (2d) 764 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926); Jones v.
Waldroup, 217 N. C. 178, 7 S. E. (2d) 366 (1940).15Cases cited supra note 14.1 Annotations: 99 A. L. R. 1080; 152 A. L. R. 427.11Ball v. Forbes, 314 Mass. 200, 49 N. E. (2d) 898 (1943).18Cases cited infra note 19.
10 Cases upholding gifts containing evidence of donative intent:
Gifts to donor and donee jointly: Abegg v. Hirst, 144 Iowa 196, 122 N. W. 838
(1909) ; Bunker v. Fidelity National Bank and Trust Co., 335 Mo. 305, 73 S. W.
2d) 242 (1934); Benton v. Smith, - Mo. App. - , 171 S. W. (2d) 767
(1943); Jones v. Waldroup, 217 N. C. 178, 7 S. E. (2d) 366 (1940); In re
Hutchison's Estate, 120 Ohio St. 542, 166 N. E. 687 (1929) ; Simonton v. Dwyer,
167 Ore. 50, 115 P. (2d) 316 (1941).
Gifts of entire ownership: Jean v. Jean, 207 Cal. 115, 277 Pac. 313 (1929);
Lynch v. Lynch, 124 Cal. App. 454, 12 P. (2d) 741 (1932) ; Thomas v. Thomas, 70
Colo. 29, 197 Pac. 243 (1921) ; Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Ward, 332 Ill. 126,
163 N. E. 319 (1928); In re Dayton's Estate, 121 Neb. 402, 237 N. W. 303
(1931) ; In re Brady's Estate, 228 App. Div. 56, 239 N. Y. Supp. 5 (1930) ; Crouse
v. Judson, 41 Misc. 338, 84 N. Y. Supp. 755 (1903) ; Ellsworth v. Ellsworth, 151 S.
W. (2d) 628 (Tex. 1941) ; Payne v. Tobacco Trading Corp., 179 Va. 156, 18 S. E.
(2d) 281 (1942); Moore v. Van Tassell, 58 Wyo. 121, 126 P. (2d) 9 (1942).
Cases upholding gifts where there was no evidence regarding donative intent
except the transfer on the corporation books:
Gifts to donor and donee jointly: Irvine v. Helvering, Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue, 99 F. (2d) 265 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938) ; Eisenhardt v. Lowell, 105
Colo. 417, 98 P. (2d) 1001 (1940) ; In re Martin's Estate, 266 S. W. 750 (Mo.
App. 1924); East Rutherford Savings, Loan & Bldg. Assn. v. McKenzie, 87 N. J.
Eq. 375, 100 Atl. 931 (1917) ; Manning v. United States National Bank of Port-
land, 174 Ore. 118, 148 P. (2d) 255 (1944).
Gifts of the entire ownership: Marshall v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
57 F. (2d) 633 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932); Whitney v. Whitney Elevator & Warehouse
Co., 121 Misc. 461, 200 N. Y. Supp. 792 (1923) ; Francis v. New York and B. E.
Ry., 108 N. Y. 93, 15 N. E. 192 (1888); Sparks v. Hurley, 208 Pa. 166, 57 Alt. 364,
101 Am. St. Rep. 926 (1904); Robert's Appeal, 85 Pa. 84 (1877); Copeland v.
Craig, 193 S. C. 484. 8 S. E. (2d) 858 (1940) ; Phillips v. Plastridge, 107 Vt. 267,
19461
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The theory of some of the cases ruling the gifts invalid is that the
transfer on the books is ineffective unless the certificate be delivered to
the donee, on the view that as long as the owner holds the certificate
he retains dominion and control over the stock and can revoke the gift
at will; that it is an attempt to make a gift to take effect in futuro.2
They say that, as far as appears, the owner had the transfer made for
his own convenience rather than as a gift, and there is no evidence that
he intended a present irrevocable transfer of title.21 But ignificantly,
in most of the cases holding this way there was evidence tending to
show that there was actually no donative intent, which was the con-
trolling element; although some of them also stated that even if a gift
was intended, this transaction was ineffective as delivery.22 Moreover,
a fair proportion of these opinions declared that transfer on the books
would have been a perfectly good way to make delivery except for the
absence of donative intent.23
For example, in Besson v. Stevens24 every indication was that the
donor did not intend a present irrevocable gift, and it was accordingly
held that such transfer was not delivery and that the donor could have
revoked the gift at any time and compelled the company to re-transfer
the stock to him. But the court said that that case was not inconsistent
with an earlier New Jersey case 25 which upheld a similar transfer to
donor and donee jointly where there was nothing to disprove donative
179 Atl. 157, 99 A. L. R. 1074 (1935) ; In re King's Estate, 49 Wyo. 453, 57 P.
(2d) 675 (1936).
Cases denying the validity where there was evidence disproving donative
intent:
Southern Industrial Institute v. Marsh, 15 F. (2d) 347 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926);
Hudgens v. Tillman, 227 Ala. 672, 151 So. 863 (1933); Hart v. Hart, 272 Ky.
488, 114 S. W. (2d) 747 (1938); White v. White, 17 S. W. (2d) 733 (Ky.
1929); Bauernschmidt v. Bauernschmidt, 97 Md. 35, 54 Atl. 637 (1903) (joint
ownership) ; Dover Cooperative Bank v. Tobin's Estate, 86 N. H. 209, 166 At.
247 (1933); Zimmerman v. Naubauser, 119 N. J. Eq. 424, 183 Atl. 820 (1936);
Crane v. I. Seymour Crane, Inc., 100 N. J. Eq. 400, 135 At. 782 (1927) ; Besson
v. Stevens, 94 N. J. Eq. 549, 120 AtI. 640 (1923) ; Reiley v. Fulper, 93 N. J. Eq.
112, 115 Atl. 661 (1921); Frazier v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 178 Okla. 512,
63 P. (2d) 11 (1936) ; Figuers v. Sherrell, 181 Tenn. 87, 178 S. W. (2d) 629, 152
A. L. R. 420 (1944) ; Swan v. Swan's Ex'r, 136 Va. 496, 117 S. E. 858 (1923).
Cases denying the validity of gifts where there was no- evidence regarding
donative intent:
Speaker v. Keating, 122 F. (2d) 706 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1941) ; Witthoft v. Com-
mercial Development & Investment Co., 46 Idaho 313, 268 Pac. 31 (1928) ; Getchell
v. Biddeford Savings Bank, 94 Me. 452, 47 Atl. 895, 80 Am. St. Rep. 408 (1900);
Matter of Crawford, 113 N. Y. 560, 21 N. E. 692, 5 L. R. A. 71 (1889).
'0 See note 19 supra. 21 Id.
22 Id. 2Id.
2, 94 N. J. Eq. 549, 120 At. 640 (1923) (corporation president transferred
stock to daughter on books, certificate remaining in cqmpany safe; he took an
assignment back from her with an irrevocable power of attorney for him to trans-
fer the stock on the books to him or his nominee; told her he had "put it in her
name," wanted it to come back to him if she died first, and at his death to come
back to the estate to enable equal distribution to all children).
"
5East Rutherford Savings, Loan & Bldg. Assn. v. McKenzie, 87 N. J. Eq.
375, 100 Atl. 931 (1913).
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intent; perhaps implying that gifts of joint estates are exempt from the
rule announced in the Besson case. In a Virginia case where the show-
ing was clearly against donative intent26 the court held that it was not a
gift, but declared that this transaction was exactly the right way to pass
title, making the donee prima facie owner; and in the absence of proof
contrary to donative intent the latter would be entitled to it. Other
cases presented in the footnote involve similar situations2 7
A few of the opinions cited in the principal case involved joint bank
deposits, 28 which have been even more fruitful of litigation than stock
transfers.29 In one case where the evidence was that no executed gift
was intendedsm the court said that such a deposit certificate was prima
fade evidence of donative intent, and, in the absence of facts disprov-
ing it, would be sufficient delivery make a valid gift.' A Massachusetts
case said that the transaction with the bank would constitute delivery
and effect a present gift if that result were intended; but that it was
still open to the donor's executor to show by attendant facts and circum-
stances that a present gift was not intended.8
2
Four cases were found ruling .the gifts invalid where there were no
facts disproving donative intent, two of them being stock transfersPa
" Swan v. Swan's Ex'r, 136 Va. 496, 117 S. E. 858 (1923) (husband trans-
ferred stock to his wife and kept certificate, voted stock, collected dividends,
listed it among his assets, made a will attempting to dispose of income from it,
and erased the "s" from "Mrs." in the certificate).
" Southern Industrial Institute v. Marsh, 15 F. (2d) 347 (C. C. A. 5th, 1926)
(shareholder directed transfer on corporation books but had the company return
the certificate to him because he wanted to deliver it personally and exact an
agreement from the donee reserving the dividends for life; he died before delivery).
Hudgens v. Tillman, 227 Ala. 672, 151 So. 863 (1933) (stockholder threatened
with alimony suit transferred stock to daughter's name, sent certificate to son-in-
law with letter disclaiming donative intent, asking latter to keep both in his safety
deposit box and tell no one).
Figuers v. Sherrell, 181 Tenn. 87, 178 S. W. (2d) 629, 152 A. L. R. 420 (1944)
(bank shareholder had certificate issued in nephew's name, kept certificate, had
bank deliver dividend checks and a stock dividend to him, voted and pledged stock,
signing nephew's name to dividend checks, proxy, assignment, and power of at-
torney, all unknown to nephew). Similar evidence is found in the cases disallow-
ing gifts in cases cited supra note 19.
£s Jones v. Fullbright, 197 N. C. 274, 148 S. E. 229 (1929) ; Nannie v. Pollard,
205 N. C. 362, 171 S. E. 341 (1933) ; Thomas v. Houston, 181 N. C. 91, 106 S. E.
466 (1921).
"9 See Harold C. Havighurst, Gifts of Bank Deposits (1936) 14 N. C. L. R-v.
129; annotations: 48 A. L. R. 189; 66 A. L. P. 881; 103 A. L. R. 1123; 135
A. L. R. 993, 149 A. L. R. 879.
"Trenton Saving Fund Society v. Byrnes, 110 N. J. Eq. 617, 160 Atl. 831
(1932).1 Id.
s2Ball v. Forbes, 314 Mass. 200, 49 A. (2d) 898 (1943).
Speaker v. Keating, 122 F. (2d) 706 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1941) (a mother assigned
mortgages to herself and daughter as joint tenants, had them recorded and kept
them, taking from the daughter an authority to collect interest); Witthoft v.
Commercial Development and Investment Co., 46 Idaho 313, 268 Pac. 31 (1928)
(shareholder had certificates issued in names of various relatives and gave them
to. a business associate, telling him "I want you to be my trustee, and in case of
death deliver these to the parties they are made out to"; they were kept in safe
1946]
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The leading case is Getchell v. Biddeford Saings Bank,3 4 which stated
that as far as appeared the transfer was made for the donor's own con-
venience, or so that the donee might receive it after his death; and that
if a gift was intended it was. not perfected by delivery.
On the other hand there are numerous cases sustaining such gifts on
the ground that transfer on the books is the equivalent of constructive
delivery.8 5 In about half of them the facts showed donative intent,
whereas in the rest there was again, merely the written transaction with
the corporation, without any declarations or conduct on the part -of. the
donor showing what had been his intention in directing the transfer.80
The North Carolina court sustained the survivor's right to the stock
under a transfer quite similar to that in the instant case in Jones v.
Waldroup, where, however, there was donative intent shown and the
certificates were in the possession of the donee3 7 The court observed
that Taylor v. Smith88 decided that a joint tenancy in personalty with
right of survivorship may be created by contract,39 and it construed the
Waldroup transaction as creating a joint tenancy with survivorship.
Further, our court has held that a gift may be made presently passing
title to the principal of a note without actual delivery, the donor keeping
the note to collect the interest for life.40 It was said there that the fact
that the donee's enjoyment of the gift was postponed until the donor's
death did not render the gift revocable or testamentary.
A case on all fours with the principal case is Eisenhardt v'. Lowell,41
where the Colorado court upheld the gift, saying that the "unequivocal
to which both had access) ; Getchell v. Biddeford Savings Bank, 94 Me. 452, 47
AtI. 895, 50 Am. St. Rep. 408 (1900) ; Matter of Crawford, 113 N. Y. 560, 21 N. E.
692, 5 L. R. A. 71 (1889) (bearer bonds were registered in donee's name, donor
retaining certificate and collecting interest).
" 94 Me. 452, 47 AtI. 895, 80 Am. St. Rep. 408 (1900) (a bank officer and
stockholder had certificates issued in his wife's name, keeping them in the bank
vault, drawing dividends and receipting for them in his own name, it not appear-
ing that she knew of the transaction; after her death he induced the bank to re-
issue them to him.. Held,.her estate was not entitled to the stock).
"'See note 19 supra.
" See note 19 supra.
.T217 N. C. 178, 7 S. E. (2d) 366 (1940) (certificates were issued to "R. M.
Waldroup or H. L. Waldroup," his wife; witnesses testified that he had made
declarations of gift, and there was testimony that the stock had been purchased
with the donee's funds).
38 116 N. C. 531, 21 S. E. 202 (1895).
31Id. It was held there that the statute [N. C. GEr. STAT. (1943) §41-2]
abolishing survivorship in joint tenancies does not prohibit persons from contract-
ing as to personalty so as to make the future rights of the parties depend on the
fact of survivorship.
That such a joint tenancy may be created by conveyance from one to himself
and another, see Irvine v. Helvering, 99 F. (2d) 265 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938).
,Parker v. Mott, 181 N. C. 435, 107 S. E. 500, 25 A. L. R. 637 (1921).
4 105 Colo. 417, 98 P. (2d) 1001 (1940) (stockholder surrendered his certif-
icate to the corporation and had it re-issued to himself and wife "as joint tenants
with right of survivorship, and not as tenants in common"; it was delivered to
him and found in his safety deposit box after his death, with no indication that
the wife knew of it).
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declarations" in the certificate are prima facie evidence of donative in-
tent, and in the absence of contrary proof vest a present right in the
stock in the donee, even though the right of enjoyment of the whole is
postponed.42 A South Carolina case, Copeknd v. Craig,43 is also iden-
tical with the principal case, except that the gift was entire instead of
joint, and the court there ruled in favor of the gift. It was said in a
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision: "Even if the certificates were
not delivered to the new shareholders, the transfers on the books were
sufficient to vest the title in the new owners if made by Von Ruck with
that intention." 44  And the Vermont court in Phillips v. Plastridge4"
upheld the gift even though the certificate was not detached from the
stock book and remained in the corporation's custody.40 Thus in all of
the cases examined where there were no signposts pointing in either
direction to aid in the search for intent, only a very few ruled against
the gift.47 Of these only two involved stock transfers, and in neither of
them was it a transfer in joint ownership.
In all this quarrel over delivery it is appropriate to recall what func-
tion delivery has traditionally been supposed to serve; namely, to be
the operation whereby the donor parts with title and dominion and vests
them in the donee.48 In view of this, it is suggested that the rule in
Eisenhardt v. Lowell, supra, that transfer on the books in joint owner-
ship is valid constructive delivery, adequately accomplishes this pur-
pose, especially because of the nature of the joint estate created.49
The transfer on the corporation books is not a barren transaction.
As between the corporation and the transferee the latter comes into
privity with the corporation and assumes the status of a shareholder,
having the right to vote in the control of the corporation and share in
42 Id.
Is 193 S. C. 484, 8 S. E. (2d) 858 (1940) (a father had his certificate re-issued
in his daughter's name, and the certificate was found in his safety deposit box at
his death; she indorsed dividend checks to him, as in the principal case).
" Schoenheit v. Lucas, 44 F. (2d) 476, 487 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930).
'5 107 Vt. 267, 179 Ad. 157, .99 A. L. R. 1074 (1935) (a father transferred
stock to daughter's name without her knowledge, no other evidence appearing).
"Id. The court said, "Phillips had divested himself of all right and title to
the stock, and the complete ownership had passed to his daughter. It was his
voluntar.y act, affording an inference of the existence of donative intent.'
In Simonton v. Dwyer, 167 Ore. 50, 115 P. (2d) 316 (1941) (a father retained
certificates taken out in children's names) in holding it a valid gift the court
said that by the transfer the donor "thereby irrevocably placed the stock beyond
his control.... He thus placed himself in a position that any interference by him
with the stock without the consent of the plaintiffs would be unauthorized and
unlawful."
'7 See note 33 supra.
,s See Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of Choses
in Action Evidenced by Commercial Instruments (1926) 21 Ill. L. REv. 341, 354.
," Cases cited supra note 19; see Mechem, Gifts or Corporation Shares (1925)
20 ILL. L. REv. 9, 27.
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its benefits.50 Now it was seen that some of the cases say that until
delivery of the certificate to the donee the donor still has control over the
stock and can compel the company to transfer it back to him, and can
deal with it as he wishes."' However, he has induced the corporation to
accept the donee as a stockholder, with resulting rights and liabilities
on both sides.52 Thenceforth, if the transfer was made with donative
intent, it is wrongful on the part of the donor or the corporation to deal
with the stock without the assent of the transferee; and throughout the
cases upholding such gifts5 3 it is reiterated that the donor by the trans-
fer has put it beyond his power lawfully to sell or assign the stock or
have the company re-issue it to him without the signature and consent
of the donee.54
The fact that the donor reserves the right to the dividends during
his lifetime does not invalidate the gift.55 As one court stated it, the
reservation of dividends "was merely a limitation on the quantity of the
contemplated gift, and in no way affected its validity." 50 Of course, if
there never was an intended gift the owner is able to have the stock
re-issued to him ;57 but it has been held, where valid gifts were made in
this manner and the donor later repudiated the gift, that the donee may
compel the donor or the corporation to restore the stock to him. 8
When we come to gifts creating joint ownership in donor and donee,
transfer on the corporation books seems to fulfill the requirements of
delivery even more adequately than in the case of a gift of the entire
interest, because delivery of the new certificate back to the donor is in
effect delivery to one of two joint tenants, and delivery to one is delivery
"'Webster v. Upton, 91 U. S. 65, 23 L. ed. 384 (1875); Thomas v. Thomas,
.70 Colo. 29, 197 Pac. 243 (1921); 6 THoMPsoN ON COPORATIONS (3rd ed.)
§§4394, 4335; 11 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS §5092.1 Cases cited supra note 19.52 Francis v. New York & B. E. Ry., 108 N. Y. 93, 15 N. E. 192 (1888).
" See note 19 supra.
" Marshall v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 57 F. (2d) 633 (C. C. A.
6th, 1932); Lynch v. Lynch, 124 Cal. App. 454, 12 P. (2d) 741 (1932); Chicago
Title & Trust Co. v. Ward, 332 Ill. 126, 163 N. E. 319 (1928) ; Benton v. Smith,
- Mo. App. -, 171 S. W. (2d) 767 (1943); Whitney v. Whitney Elevator &
Warehouse Co., 121 Misc. 461, 200 N. Y. Supp. 792 (1923) ; Francis v. New York
& B. E. Ry., 108 N. Y. 93, 15 N. E. 192 (1888); Sinpnton v. Dwyer, 167 Ore.
50, 115 P. (2d) 316 (1941) ; Manning v. U. S. Nat'l Bank of Portland, 174 Ore.
118, 148 P. (2d) 255 (1944); Robert's Appeal, 85 Pa. 84 (1877); Copeland v.
Craig, 193 S. C. 484, 8 S. E. (2d) 858 (1940) ; Ellsworth v. Ellsworth, 151 S. W.
(2d) 628 (Tex. 1941) ; Phillips v. Plastridge, 107 Vt. 267, 179 Atl. 157, 99 A. L. R.
1074 (1935); CHRISTY, THE TRANSERn OF SToCK (1929) §220; 2 CooK oN CoR-
PORATIONS (8th ed.) §308; MACHEN, MODERN LAW OF CORPORATIONS (1908 ed.)
§1006.55Grissom v. Sternberger, 10 F. (2d) 764 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926).
Smith v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 59 F. (2d) 533 (C. C. A. 9th,
193 Hotaling v. Hotaling, 187 Cal. 695, 203 Pac. 745 (1922).
"
8 Jean v. Jean, 207 Cal. 115, 277 Pac. 313 (1929) ; Lynch v. Lynch, 124 Cal.
App. 454, 12 P. (2d) 741 (1932); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Ward, 332 Ill.
126, 163 N. E. 319 (1928).
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to both, just as possession of one is possession of both.p Moreover,
since in this situation the donor is not giving away his entire interest in
the property, but is retaining an undivided one-half interest with right
of survivorship, it is not at all inconsistent with a valid gift for him to
retain dominion and control to the extent of his interest,60 as long as
he does not exercise sole dominion; and this he cannot do because the
donee's assent is necessary for any disposition he makes of the stock.6 '
If the donee indorse dividend checks to him, he receives the proceeds
by the donee's act and not from the corporation, thus recognizing the
donee's ownership.6 2
Thus it seems that transfer in joint ownership accomplishes what
actual delivery is supposed to do-provide the donee with means of
obtaining dominion over the gift, as far as the nature of the property
and the extent of the gift allow.es Of course, if there is anything pres-
ent to cast doubt on the donative intent, the transaction is ineffective
to pass title, just as would be actual delivery of a chattel without dona-
tive intent.64 But in our problem, lacking any evidence on intent, the
language of the certificate itself should permit an inference sufficient in
the absence of a contrary showing to make a prima facie case of donative
intent.6 5 It should testify that the donor has consciously attempted to
create a present joint estate.66 When this intent is translated into de-
livery by transfer on the books, the donor has performed an act chang-
ing the character of his possession from that of sole owner to that of
a co-tenant.
0 7
Abegg v. Hirst, 144 Iowa 196, 122 N. W. 838 (1909); Benton v. Smith,
Mo..App. - , 171 S. W. (2d) 767 (1943); East Rutherford Savings, Loan
& Bldg. Assn. v. McKenzie, 87 N. J. Eq. 375, 100 Atl. 931 (1917); Mechem,
supra note 13, at 27.
o Cases involving joint gifts cited supra note 19. In East Rutherford Savings,
Loan & Bldg. Assn. v. McKenzie, cited supra note 59, the court said that the donor,
"as joint tenant with right of survivorship, had such an interest in his right of
survivorship as permitted him to hold and manage the joint property for the best
advantage of all concerned.
"l See note 54 supra,
"Lynch v. Lynch, 124 Cal. App. 454, 12 P. (2d) 741 (1932); Copeland v.
Craig, 193 S. C. 484, 8 S. E. (2d) 858 (1940).
" See Mechem, supra note 13, at 27; Mechem, Delivery in Gifts of Chattels
(1926) 21 ILL. L. REv. 341, 354.
'See note 2 supra.
"Edmonds v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 90 F. (2d) 14 (C. C. A.
9th, 1937); Lynch v. Lynch, 124 Cal. App. 454, 12 P. (2d) 741 (1932); Eisen-
hardt v. Lowell, 105 Colo. 417, 98 P. (2d) 1001 (1940) ; East Rutherford Savings,
Loan & Bldg. Assn. v. McKenzie, 87 N. J. Eq. 375, 100 Atl. 931 (1917) ; Cope-
land v. Craig, 193 S. C. 484, 8 S. E. (2d) 858 (1940) ; Simton v. Dwyer, 167 Ore.
50, 115 P. (2d) 316 (1941) ; Manning v. U. S. Nat'l Bank of Portland, 174 Ore.
118, 148 P. (2d) 255 (1944).
" In Eisenhardt v. Lowell, cited supra note 65, the court said, "The unequiv-
ocal declarations of the new certificate are taken as prima fade disclosing the
apparent intention of Mr. Lowell to create a joint estate." In Manning v. U. S.
Nat'l Bank of Portland, cited supra note 65, it -was said, "We find in the written
instruments convincing proof of the existence of such intent."
'7 Napier v. Eigel, 350 Mo. 111, 164 S. W. (2d) 908 (1942).
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. This rationale was not followed in the principal case; rather it was
intimated that even if donative intent were conceded, this transaction
fell short of the requisite delivery.68 It is submitted that the decision
contains an inconsistency. While the majority opinion recognized that
a -joint tenancy in personalty may be created by contract,69 it ruled that
the donee was not entitled to all the stock as survivor, but granted her
the half interest which had been conceded by the parties.70 But in order for
any part of the title to vest in her by gift there must have been donative
intent and delivery.71 By conceding her the half interest the parties
conceded donative intent and delivery; and although the court was only
determining title to that portion of the stock which was in dispute, yet
this concession of the parties created a necessary inference which was a
part of the agreed case. Therefore, if donative intent and delivery were
present it would be an executed gift in joint ownership, and she should
take all by the right of survivorship incorporated in the instrument
creating the gift.7 2
In the final analysis, the parties here stipulated certain facts.
Whether there was constructive delivery with donative intent was the
crucial fact to be determined, the answer being an inference of fact.
The dissent said that the majority opinion conceded that there were
permissible inferences of fact yet undetermined, 7 but ruled against the
donee because not enough facts were stipulated on which to base a defi-
nite decision.74 The dissent contended that the cause should have been
remanded for further proceedings to determine fully the facts, citing
cases in which that was done when the case agreed did not state enough
8 In a memorandum in 226 N. C. app. stated not to be binding on the court,
but rather in explanation of the denial of the petition to rehear, it was said, "A
joint tenancy in stock with a provision for survival of ownership, where the donor
retains custody of the stock, nothing else appearing, in our opinion, does not meet
the definition of a gift inter zivos. The possession of a joint tenant is not that
exclusive, absolute, and unconditional possession contemplated in a gift inter
zivos."8 Citing Taylor v. Smith, 116 N. C. 531, 21 S. E. 202 (1895).
" The court said, "We note that appellants concede that Rossie Mae Barnes
was entitled to one half interest in the 70 shares, upon the view that the statute
(G. S. 41-2) converted the joint tenancy into tenancy in common, and that by
virtue of his right to partition under G. S. 46-42, the testator retained control
over his property to the extent of his interest therein.'
G. S. §41-42, however, does not convert joint tenancies into tenancies in com-
mon; it merely abolishes survivorship as an incident to existing joint tenancies
where it would occur by operation of law, and does not prohibit persons from con-
tracting in such manner as to create survivorship. (See note 39 supra.) And as
the dissent stated, the fact that G. S. §46-42 gives a joint tenant the right to
petition for partition has no bearing on the question of delivery or whether thejoint estate was created. He had that right no matter who held the certificate
and regardless how the estate was created. "The estate created and not the
retention of the certificate gave him the right."7 1Newman v. Bost, 122 N. C. 524, 29 S. E. 848 (1898).2Jones v. Waldroup, 217 N. C. 178, 7 S. E. (2d) 366 (1940).T8Buffaloe v. Barnes, cited supra note 1, at 319.74Id. at 324 (dissenting opinion). "
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facts for a fair conclusion of law to be drawn.75 If the gift is not to
be approved under the theory suggested herein, then it would seem
preferable to take the action urged by the dissenting opinion.76 If no
additional facts could be stipulated, it would be an appropriate case for
a jury to determine whether there was donative intent and delivery.77
LOGAN D. HOWELL.
7 Trustees of Elon College v. Elon Banking & Trust Co., 182 N. C. 298, 109
S. E. 6 (1921); Briggs v. Asheville Developers, 191 N. C. 784, 133 S. E. 3(1926). To the same effect see Hood v. Johnson, 208 N. C. 77, 178 S. E. 855(1935) ; Sedbury v. Southern Express Co., 164 N. C. 363, 79 S. E. 286 (1913).
However, in the court's memorandum denying the petition to rehear, cited supra
note 68, it was said that even if donative intent or other inferences were drawn
from further findings of fact, it could not cure the lack of absolute delivery, of
the stock to the donee which is necessary in a gift inter vivos.
' In Zollicoffer v. Zollicoffer, 168 N. C. 326, 84 S. E. 349 (1915), our court
allowed the question of delivery to go to the jury when the evidence on the whole
tended to show that there had been no delivery. And in Grissom v. Sternberger,
10 F. (2d) 764 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926), it was held error for the trial judge to rule
as a matter of law that there was no gift; it was for the jury to say what in-
ferences were to be drawn.
"The opinion in the principal case did not refer to the applicability of the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act [N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§55-81 to 55-104], en-
acted in North Carolina in 1941. The general purpose of the Act is to cbnfer
attributes of negotiability upon stock certificates; as a corollary, the importance of
the transfer on the corporation books is diminished. For discussion of the general
problem see Mechem, supra note 13, at 28; Notes (1941) 19 N. C. L. REV. 469,(1939) 37 Micm. L. Rxv. 480, 48 YALE L. J. 897.
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